Concept-Expression-Reference

Constrasting Realism

The Concept–Expression–Reference concept explicitly rejects the assumptions of realism. Unlike realist perspectives, it does not posit that concepts correspond to pre-existing, objective entities in the world. Observation is not treated as a transparent window onto reality; rather, it is always mediated through operational distinctions, expressions and reference. Concepts are not discovered in the world, but constructed and stabilized through repeated engagement in operational systems. Expressions do not reveal intrinsic properties, and references do not point to absolute entities. They function only within the relational and operational context of observation.

Realism assumes that meaning, truth, or correspondence exists independently of observers and their operations. In contrast, within this concept, these features emerge only through interaction between concept, expression and reference. Even so-called “objective facts” are treated as operationally viable constructs that gain relevance through observation and system interaction. This makes the concept compatible with radical and relational constructivism while avoiding solipsism: it recognizes the necessity of observable objects and interactions without requiring them to possess independent, pre-determined meaning.

In sum, the concept demonstrates that what realism presupposes as intrinsic properties of the world, fixed meaning, observable objects and inherent truth, is, from a constructivist standpoint, the result of operationally viable relations among concepts, expressions, and references.